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Beyond the nation and into the state: identity,
belonging, and the ‘hyper-border’
Paul Benjamin Richardson
The case of the disputed Southern Kuril Islands/Northern Territories is used to introduce the term ‘hyper-border’
in order to examine the instrumental and pragmatic nature of identity. It seeks to capture how, on one of Russia’s
most isolated borders, the quotidian realities and challenges of life ‘beyond’ the state had profound implications
for how discourses around state, nation, sovereignty and identity are conceived. During the 1990s these islands
became a site neither fully within, nor without the state. As the functions of the Russian state diminished and the
border with Japan dematerialised, it was the Japanese state that came to provide welfare, infrastructure and
economic opportunities for the islanders. This paper attempts to capture how the identity of islanders became
articulated not on ethnic, religious or linguistic grounds, but on a purely pragmatic desire for a better life. Among
some Kuril islanders an alternative vision of belonging was formulated, which sought to take them beyond the
nation and into the state. This paper also traces the counter-function of the hyper-border and how an immense
material and discursive response to these circumstances by the Russian state led to the recovery of the meaning of
these distant islands. On a site between sovereignty regimes, this idea of the hyper-border attempts to capture how
the fluctuating political authority of the state can render identity as contingent, malleable and instrumental.
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Introduction
On the remote and beguiling Southern Kuril Islands,1 a
few thousand residents cling to tiny villages, nestled in
isolated bays, and sheltered from north Pacific storms by
towering headlands and smouldering volcanoes. During
the 1990s, after the dramatic and sudden collapse of the
Soviet Union, the Russian citizens living here came to
endure extreme socio-economic hardships, while at the
same time the Japanese state began to replace certain
functions and services that the Russian state was unable
to provide. Under this unusual sovereignty regime,
alternative understandings related to the ‘border’,
‘state’ and ‘nation’ emerged. It was on this extreme
periphery that a pragmatic desire for a ‘normal’ life
began to take precedence over nationalist exhortations
of immutable borders and inviolable national space
emanating from elsewhere in Russia.
Through the issues swirling over the Southern
Kurils, this paper strives to add new complexities and
subtleties to the models and frameworks recently put
forward in the border studies literature (see, for
example, Brunet-Jailly 2011; Konrad 2015; Payan
2014). Rather than offering a grand theoretical narra-
tive for borders, it presents a detailed empirical study
that explores the implications on the border of a state
that is no longer able to effectively promote ‘ties of
loyalty and identity instrumentally, by fulfilling the
material needs of its citizens’ (Sahlins 1989, 291). This
paper examines how such a set of circumstances
emerged on the Southern Kurils in the early 1990s,
and how the residents of these islands began to depend
more on another state for their welfare. We will see the
ways in which these islanders employed highly sophis-
ticated and effective strategies to cope with and exploit
the dissonances that began to appear between the
rhetoric of state elites in Moscow and the reality of the
Russian state’s presence.
The Southern Kurils are a site where the structures
and services of the state are essential for the very
existence of the community living here. Without the
state’s provision of welfare, transportation, healthcare,
communications and subsidies, a modern standard of
living on these islands would be almost impossible to
sustain. It is in such conditions that we find on this
periphery an inversion of what James Scott outlined in
his understanding of the Zomia2 that make up the
expansive uplands of Southeast Asia. Until the 1950s,
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these Zomia lay distant and inaccessible from the main
sectors of economic activity, and were essentially
beyond the control of either state or imperial gover-
nance (Scott 2009, 11). If for Scott, the ‘economic,
political, and cultural organization’ of the peoples of
Zomia emerged in large part as ‘a strategic adaptation
to avoid incorporation in state structures’ (2009, 39),
then, in the post-Soviet era, on the Southern Kurils, we
see adaptive strategies designed to achieve precisely the
opposite, i.e. concerted efforts to maximise the material
benefits of incorporation into the state. On these
islands we find residents energised and organised
around becoming more fully subsumed into the frame-
work and services of the state, regardless of which state
lays claim to their locality.
With Japan contesting Russia’s ownership of the
Southern Kurils, this paper demonstrates how some
islanders began to see greater advantage in Japanese
sovereignty, rather than the perceived limitations of
Russian statehood. Through this tension emerges the
potential and power of a site beyond state-space, where
the ‘instrumental notion of nationhood seems to dom-
inate’ (Sahlins 1989, 292). In Sahlins’ study of themaking
of the French and Spanish states in the Cerdanya valley,
he notes how citizens of this borderland ‘nationalized
their local economic or political interests and their local
identities’ (1989, 291). In the early 1990s, as the new
Russian state took shape, this is precisely what we find on
the Southern Kurils as the residents of these distant
islands became ‘conscientious and unabashed manipu-
lators of identity in the service of their interests, masters
of the techniques of shaping identities’ (1989, 292).
There emerged on these islands a pragmatic sense of
loyalty, whereby securing an improvement in the eco-
nomic prospects of islanders became privileged over
emotional appeals to the primacy of the Russian nation
and national space. Drawing on contemporary Russian
language sources, including material only accessible in
the Russian Far East – as well as the author’s own
interviews and observations from extended stays in the
region – this paper seeks to explore these instrumental,
performative and discursive features of identity.
The following sections trace how an insecurity and
fear about the fraying of sovereignty and identity
emerged at the level of official discourse, both locally
and centrally. It charts the relationship between centre
and periphery, and the nature of islanders’ engagement
with the Russian state. The pronouncements and texts
of elites at the local and national level reveal how these
aspirations became framed – in various ways – through
a cultural understanding and rhetoric of the nation and
national identity (see Calhoun 1997, 6). It is from the
dissonance between discourses produced at different
geographical scales that the idea of the ‘hyper-border’3
is introduced in order to demonstrate how the quotid-
ian realities and challenges of life beyond state-space
can work to subvert, negotiate and remake taken-for-
granted notions surrounding ideas of state sovereignty
and national identity. It strives to capture what happens
when a locale is rendered neither fully within, nor
without the state. The hyper-border is in essence a site
that has, in certain ways, moved ‘over’, ‘outside’ or
‘beyond’ traditional understandings of the state border
and state sovereignty. It is where certain functions of
the state – in terms of delivering welfare, infrastructure,
healthcare and services – have come to be provided by
an alternate state, and, in this case, one with a
competing claim on this territory.
We find on the hyper-border a series of denials and
rejections of a coherent and cohesive national identity.
Yet, we also see how such denials simultaneously serve
to rejuvenate and regenerate the very object that they
seek to deny (Lane 2009, 88). It is in this aspect that
we can perhaps glimpse elements of Baudrillard’s
hyperreality (1983). For the hyper-border also pos-
sesses a counter-function – one that works towards
reifying the fiction of a fixed, coherent and stable
‘national’ identity. Through the concurrent invocation
of the hyper-border at sites far removed from these
islands, we find a world ‘where the hyperreal produces
a society of surfaces, performativity and fragmenta-
tion’ (Lane 2009, 89). It is through this counter-
function that the hyper-border can be understood less
as a fixed line of division on a map and more like a
fibre-optic cable, connecting instantaneously a specific
locale with far broader debates that serve to both
deny and reconstitute ideas of national space, belong-
ing and identity. Through the hyper-border, we can
fleetingly capture the dynamic, ephemeral and con-
tradictory nature of bordering practices, as well as the
various forms of power – economic, political and
cultural – which are instrumental in both constituting
sovereignty and ‘persuading’ people of their identity.
To explore this counter-function, this paper charts
how in recent years a dramatic response from the state
manifested itself in the form of an immense ideational
and economic effort to mediate the tensions engen-
dered by the ‘hyper-border’. This process has been
orientated towards recovering the meaning of the
Kurils and rendering them symbolic of a strong state
and a dynamic leadership, able to exert political
authority over every last inch of national space.
Therefore, this paper also charts the diminishment of
the hyper-border in the 2000s, which came with the re-
imposition of imperial imaginings onto the borders and
borderlands of the Russian state. Yet, at the same time,
it is the voices of those on the extreme political and
geographical margins of the state that lie at the heart of
this paper. While these islands may be a site where the
resurgent state’s power is most keenly felt, they are also
where discourses of national identity and homeland
become inflected, and even remade.
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Therefore, the idea of the hyper-border can strik-
ingly reveal ‘the messy, contested, and often intensely
social business of making territory “integral”’ (Reeves
2014, 6). It shares with Madeleine Reeve’s Border Work
a concern with the everyday workings of power at the
edge of impoverished, or newly impoverished states
(2014, 7), and provides us with an account of the
‘intimate relationship between the existence of spatial
gaps and the gaps between law and life’ (2014, 246).
Drawing on the making and remaking of borders in the
Ferghana Valley, Reeves highlights precisely how a
dissonance between reality and rhetoric, and between
closures and openings on the border, above all else
remind us of the extent to which the ‘state’may be constituted
and reconstituted by those gaps – and by the sovereign
enactment of attempts to close them. (2014, 246)
Just as in rural Central Asia, we can observe the
residents of the Southern Kurils conducting their own
kind of border work – one that is frequently aligned in
opposition to the border work of the state.
It is on these islands that the emergence of the hyper-
border came to represent an extraordinary challenge to
the political authority of theRussian state. At this locale a
form of separatism became articulated that was not based
on ethnic, religious or linguistic grounds, but was centred
on the practical rationale of securing a better quality of
life. This claim is not to deny that more ‘traditional’
determinants associated with identity remained signifi-
cant, but rather to emphasise the notion of a ‘political
imagination’ among the residents of these islands, which
acknowledges the assemblage of discourses and political
expediency that characterise any community. Instead of
privileging one discourse or practice over another, the
idea of the political imagination
allows us to write about the ways political life is being
thought, without presupposing that all such representations
are attached to the hidden motives or economic interests of
powerful social groups. (Humphrey 2002, 259)
The political imagination combines ‘the diverse wealth
of ideas, emotions, and compulsions that face us’
(Humphrey 2002, 259), in this case when talking about
identity. It is also based on an understanding that
certain practices of the political imagination can also
‘“have their time” . . . when they have a currency and
are widely popular’, while later they may become the
subject of derision, only to be replaced by other ideas
(2002, 260). The intention here is not to suggest that an
instrumental understanding of loyalty and identity
usurps other considerations, or that it supersedes
discourses related to legitimating local leaders’ efforts
to remain in power. Rather, it can help us to under-
stand how even the most vulnerable and seemingly
marginal in society can contribute ideas of great
significance – including contradictory and heretical
ones – which then co-exist with a host of alternative
claims on identity and group cohesion.
The co-existence and variation in the weighting of
‘factors pushing and pulling’ social movements has also
been noted by Stuart Kaufman in his work on ethnic
mobilisation (2015, 11). In order to explain ethnic
mobilisation in conflict situations, Kaufman has sug-
gested a symbolic theory of politics, based on a
recognition that
different people react to similar circumstances based on
their biases, prejudices, values, and ideology – their symbolic
predispositions. It also considers how preferences shift with
emotions. In explaining political conflict, the key emotions
are fears – more precisely, feelings of threat either to
physical security or to status, identity, or economic
prospects. (2015, 12)
The hyper-border highlights a set of economic motives
that, for Kuril Islanders, served to stimulate dissatis-
faction with the Russian state through fears over socio-
economic insecurity, which at the same time co-existed
with emotional appeals towards nationalism and patri-
otism. It demonstrates that as islanders’ economic
prospects diminished these material factors became of
increasingly critical importance in shaping the political
imagination of a community residing beyond the state.
As such, on the Southern Kurils, the socio-economic
conditions behind the fraying of loyalty to the Russian
state saw the development of a separatist claim that was
articulated in a somewhat different way from elsewhere
in Russia. In Chechnya, for example, separatist ten-
dencies have been based on ethnoreligious grounds and
historical grievances. Similarly, in Ukraine, the on-
going conflict is framed by most political elites in
Russia as a struggle for autonomy to overcome ethnic
and linguistic discrimination against Russians by the
new Ukrainian government (Williams 2014). However,
if the Ukrainian state is ever able to offer certain
incentives and resources to the current residents of
Crimea – annexed by Russia in March 2014 – then this
territory could become a source of the same challenges
and tensions outlined in this paper. It is also perhaps
one reason why the Russian state is currently investing
extraordinary resources into developing this region
(Hanauer 2014).
There is insufficient space here to present a
comparative study of other cases, but it is tentatively
suggested that the idea of the hyper-border may also
have applicability outside post-Soviet space. From a
historical perspective, Sahlins’ study of the border
between France and Spain in the Cerdanya area of the
Pyrenees carries many features of a hyper-border in an
age of state formation (Sahlins 1989). More recently
Reece Jones’ study of border enclaves in India and
Bangladesh has revealed locales existing in more ways
than one ‘beyond’ state borders. In these enclaves, local
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people developed adaptive strategies to negotiate and
mediate particular socio-economic and political reali-
ties, which in turn led to an inflected sense of loyalty
toward their ‘own’ state (Jones 2009). At the same
time, these enclaves have also generated a counter-
function that became bound on the Indian side to a
wider narrative of Hindu nationalism and the immu-
table territorial body of India (2009, 379).
The Falkland/Malvinas Islands could also be seen as
another distant island community carrying features of
the hyper-border, at least before the war of 1982. From
the early 1970s, islanders came to increasingly depend
on Argentina after an air service was established, and
with it the regular supply of fresh food, produce and
other goods (Welch 1997, 487). There was even a
prevailing sense at the British Foreign Office at the
time that the ‘economic welfare of the islands
depended upon a closer association with Argentina’
(1997, 487). David Welch (1997) has outlined the
policy implications of these islands shifting in certain
ways beyond state-space, and the dramatic reconfigu-
ration of identity discourses and state-engagement
before, during and after the war. Within the scope of
this paper, it is impossible to apply the lens of the
hyper-border to these or other cases, aside from
suggesting that possibilities can emerge in such a
community’s political imagination for a pragmatic and
heretical desire to be subsumed into the state that can
best promote people’s economic and social welfare,
rather than the state where ethnic, linguistic or
religious loyalties may supposedly lie. At the same
time, it is through such tensions that the counter-
function of the hyper-border can stimulate the state
into suddenly mobilising immense efforts to reconsti-
tute these ties.
The rest of this paper attempts to relate some of the
broader issues and theoretical concerns outlined in this
introduction to the specifics and challenges of life on
the Southern Kurils. What follows is an account of the
near collapse of a functioning Russian state on these
islands in the 1990s, which left residents impoverished
and disconnected from Russia. It examines the rapid
dematerialisation of the inter-state border between
Japan and Russia as the paraphernalia and structures
that enforced it were suddenly reconfigured. The
border became open to flows of people, goods and
ideas that were previously tightly controlled, curtailed
and regulated. At the same time, legal and illegal
economic opportunities flourished, and through a
special visa-free exchange programme on the islands,
as well as humanitarian aid, the Japanese state
increasingly came to exert its infrastructural power on
these islands through projects such as the provision of
health clinics, electricity generators, school buildings
and port facilities. As subjects of an increasingly
uncertain sovereignty regime, islanders came to deploy
adaptive strategies in order to improve their own lives
on this isolated periphery.
Beyond the state
The islands of the Southern Kurils form part of a
volcanic chain stretching from the northeast coast of
Hokkaido, Japan, to the southern tip of Kamchatka,
Russia (see Figures 1 and 2). They are comprised of
Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the rocks and small
islands that make up the unpopulated Habomai group.4
Between 1855 (when the border between Russia and
Japan was first formalised by treaty), and 1945, the
Southern Kurils had been recognised by both sides as
part of Japan (in 1875, the entire Kuril chain was
designated as part of Japan under the terms of the
Treaty of St Petersburg). However, from September
1945, with Japan’s defeat in the Second World War,
Soviet soldiers and citizens began to settle on these
islands and they came to symbolise one of the most
striking cultural and ideological borders of the Cold
War. By the end of 1948, the last of the Japanese who
had remained on the islands were deported (Sevela
2001, 75). Today the Russian Federation administers
these islands, though they are contested by Japan and
referred to collectively as the Northern Territories.
Much of the post-war history of these islands has
been characterised by Japan and the Soviet Union/
Russia tirelessly asserting their arguments by invoking
geography, prior discovery and development, as well as
international law and treaties in order to justify their
claims (see, for example, Call 1992; Hasegawa 1998;
Kuhrt 2007; Stephan 1974). The closest the Soviet and
Figure 1 Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands
Source: Thanks to Ann Ankcorn of the Drawing Office at
the Department of Geography, Earth and Environmental
Sciences, University of Birmingham for producing these
maps
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Japanese sides came to a compromise on the islands’
future was when the idea of the transfer of Shikotan
and the Habomai Islands was proposed by the Soviet
side in return for a Peace Treaty. Although both
parliaments ratified a Joint Declaration in 1956, an
exchange of the islands was never realised and even
today a post-war Peace Treaty between the two
countries has yet to be signed. It was not until the
coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, and
the subsequent onset of political and economic
reforms, that the destiny of these islands became a
topic for public debate in Russia. This paper takes up
the issue of the Southern Kurils in the immediate post-
Soviet period when, with the decline and collapse of the
Soviet Union, these islands assumed a radically new
significance, one that propelled them to the centre of a
national debate over what and where is Russia.
At precisely the same time as the dispute over the
Southern Kurils became more widely known, these
islands also became increasingly detached from the
structures of the Russian state. Although not unique to
Russia at the time, the residents of these islands
experienced particularly acutely the change in circum-
stances brought about by the end of the Soviet Union,
with foodstuffs and other materials suddenly reflecting
the true costs of importation as state subsidies and
privileges fell away (on Magadan region, see Round
2005 2006). The situation deteriorated during the
1990s, and many just gave up on the struggle and
returned to the mainland. In 2001, Evgenii Verlin wrote
in the magazine Ekspert that 50 years after the Japanese
were forcibly deported, the Russian residents are now
beginning to ‘self-deport’ themselves back to the
mainland. In 1989 there had been a population of
29 500 on the entire Kuril chain, but by 2007 the Atlas
Kurilskikh Ostrovov put the figure at 19 000 (Komed-
chikov 2009, 445).
Those who remained were forced to endure
extremely high tariffs for air and sea transport, as well
as electricity 2.4 to 3 times higher than regional tariffs,
alongside a deficiency of dwellings and unreliable
heating and electricity (Belonosov 1999, 61). In 1991
a lack of funds to repair the runway of the airport on
Kunashir forced its closure and it was not until
September 1995 that it was reopened (Hasegawa
1998, 612). A regular ferry service between Yuzhno-
Kuril’sk and Sakhalin also ceased to operate (Vakh-
nenko 1999, 59), while in winter, ships and boats did
not run for weeks (Verlin 2001). The islands became to
a large degree disconnected from the Russian main-
land, with the price of goods reportedly four times that
of Moscow (Hasegawa 1998, 612). As the state scaled
back, the withdrawal of the military presence on the
islands also removed an important actor for providing
‘emergency transportation, communications, supplies,
and many other things vital for [islanders’] survival’
(Kunadze 2000, 160).
By the end of the 1990s a pointed symbol of islanders’
dislocation from the Russian mainland was that resi-
dents of Yuzhno-Kuril’sk – the main town on Kunashir –
were receiving several Japanese TV channels, but
Russian broadcasts from Sakhalin were either jammed
by the Japanese broadcasts or were out of range
(Vakhnenko 1999, 58–9). As for industry, ‘the majority
of enterprises on the islands lay idle [and] from 1993 to
1997 the production of fishing and processing enter-
prises had decreased by a third’ (VK 1998). In 1998 it was
reported that at the fishing cooperative on Shikotan the
staff were paying themselves in fish as wages were not
being paid (Elistratov 1998, 14). When the following
Figure 2 Kuril Island Chain (with dates international boundary was formed)
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year six deputies from the State Duma visited the islands
of Shikotan and Kunashir they declared that ‘at the
moment the state cannot effectively manage social-
economic processes on the Far Eastern shores of Russia’
(Belonosov 1999, 65).
As recently as 2005, a survey on the islands revealed
that islanders were primarily concerned with price
increases (86.7% of respondents from a multiple answer
questionnaire), followed by a reduction in income
(40.3%), a shortage of hospitals and clinics (28%) and
arrears of wages and pensions (12%) (Iwashita 2006,
47). In the same year, the Russian Far East’s leading
business magazine, Dal’nevostochnyi Kapital, published
an article explaining that attracting labour to the islands
in their current state was difficult when ‘wages are no
greater here than on the mainland’ and transport links
with Sakhalin still had ‘no kind of order’ (Nikitin 2005,
15). The article reported that in their wait for cancelled
planes and boats, people carry with them the philosophy
that ‘the Kurils teach patience’ (2005, 17). Such patience
could also have tragic consequences and, in the first
eight months of 2005, two islanders had died while
waiting for a medical team from Sakhalin to arrive
(Nikitin 2005). At the time, Galiya Kunchenko, editor of
the local newspaper Krasnyi Mayak stressed how the
state of the islands was affecting the islanders’mentality:
[In the early 1990s,] when everything just collapsed, the
people were depressed. Even so, the majority were opposed
to an exchange [of the islands to Japan]. Then it seemed to
get a little better [but in] the last three years [things] have
been again on the decline. It is a very bad swing for
mentality [. . .] in everyday life I notice there has begun to
appear a kind of spitefulness – towards the authorities,
towards life, towards oneself. (Kunchenko 2005, 18)
Such feelings of resentment and disappointment, born
out of the catastrophic conditions on the islands and the
state’s sudden absence, highlighted how this locale was
moving in certain ways beyond the state. The loyalty of
islanders towards the Russian state, and to its represen-
tatives, was being tested to the extreme. However, on the
hyper-border of the Southern Kurils, unlike elsewhere in
Russia, the incorporation of these islands into the
Japanese state presented islanders with a radical alter-
native to the reality of living under the prevailing
conditions. As these islands came to exist almost outside
of Russian state-space, they also became increasingly
subject to the infrastructural power of Japan, and with it
the hyper-border became invested with a salience and
resonance that reached far beyond these islands.
The porous border
From the early 1990s, a number of gaps in the state
border with Japan appeared on the Southern Kurils. It
was a moment of a proliferation of new contacts and
connections in a once closed space. With Japan visible
from the southernmost islands of the Kuril chain, one
journalist recounted in 1998 that ‘Today the residents
of Kunashir gaze with melancholy and hope across the
15 km South-Kuril channel towards the Japanese coast’
(Ostrovskii 1998, 2). In 2005, an article in Argumenty i
Fakty noted just how important Japan had become for
islanders over the years, claiming that every year the
town of Nemuro (a small port on Hokkaido’s northeast
coast) was receiving $10 million from Russian visitors:
‘Nemuro is full of Kuril Islanders [ . . . ] they rush to this
city to shop, as Muscovites go to hyper-markets on the
Ring-road’ (Zotov 2005, 43). It was a remarkable
parallel to draw, with the islanders transcending an
international, cultural and linguistic boundary as
opposed to merely crossing the Moscow ring road.
However, it emphasised just how routine a reliance on
Japan had become, while an article from the journal
Inzhener similarly described how islanders were now
almost completely dependent on Japan:
In recent years the [Russian] state practically ceased
delivering to the Southern Kurils provisions and consumer
goods. However, in the shops there is everything: vegetables
and fruit throughout the year. And it is all from Japan [ . . . ]
wages are tiny and paid with great delay, but you could not
find a family on Kunashir who do not own one or two cars.
What is more, what great cars [ . . . ] all are in 494s! [ . . . ]
Petrol and diesel are not delivered here at all! [Yet] that
does not at all hinder the active movement of vehicles.
(Ostrovskii 1998, 2)
As the journalist further explained, boats from the
Kurils would depart to Hokkaido with holds full of
undocumented catches of fish, only to return after a
few days ‘with cars, petrol in barrels, products and
baggage. How much fish goes the other way is only
known to the ship’s crew’ (1998, 3).
A lucrative trade in fish and seafood flourished
between Kuril Islanders and Hokkaido, however, as one
Russian commentator lamented in the late 1990s, what
a pity ‘that it is absolutely illegal and of a criminal
nature’ (Golovnin 1997, cited in Williams 2003a, 711).
The head of the administration of the Southern Kuril
region, Vladimir Zema, suggested in 1998 that, in recent
years, up to 50 per cent of the trade was contraband
(VK 1998, 3). Frustration at the state’s inability to
enforce its own borders and protect its bio-resources
from Japanese or Russian poachers was voiced in 1998
by Colonel Anatolii Mil’kin (head of command of the
border division on the Southern Kurils), who stated with
‘undisguised bitterness’ that ‘Our patrol boats and
helicopters are without fuel. Every exit to the sea and
every take off is an event’ (Ostrovskii 1998, 3), while the
then Chairman of the Sakhalin Regional Duma, Boris
Tretyak, made the extraordinary claim that the cost of
the fish caught by Japanese vessels around the Southern
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Kurils amounted to an estimated $700–800 million
every year (VK 1998, 3). Even as recently as 2008, it was
reported that
the [Russian] ‘poachers’ boats will often come into the zone
of contact with a Russian patrol vessel. The pursuers and the
pursued do not chase around but usually the ‘patrollers’
know without exception all of ‘our poachers’ and willingly
take their ‘tribute’. (Zygan’shin 2008, 162–3)
Alongside bribery and poaching, in 1998 an agree-
ment on cooperation in fishing operations between
Japan and Russia also granted a legal right for
Japanese boats to fish for specified species and quotas
in return for a licence fee (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation 1998; Zilanov and Plot-
nikov 2001). In response to these activities, an article
in Ekspert, in 2001, claimed that Russian border
guards ‘watch through their fingers the disgraceful
activity’ of such joint economic ventures (Verlin 2001),
while Obozrevatel reported that this agreement
represented
A uniquely anti-Russian direction [which] for all practical
purposes confirmed the rejection by Russia of its sovereign
rights in its own territorial waters [ . . . ] It is in essence the
creeping transfer to Japan of the territorial waters of Russia.
(Zilanov and Plotnikov 2001)
It appeared to these authors that the Southern Kurils
and their surrounding waters were becoming a site
where the Russian state’s ability to regulate its borders
and exercise its exclusive territorial sovereignty were
being critically undermined. The border with Japan
seemed to be unravelling, while at the same time the
Japanese state was beginning to assume extraordinary
new roles and functions on these islands.
Contested sovereignty and dependence on
Japan
The visa-free programme
For the Russian residents of the Southern Kurils, as
well as for the former Japanese inhabitants, their
descendants and connected individuals, there exists a
unique visa-free regime for visiting the other country. A
programme of visa-free visits, approved by both
governments, has run from 1992 until today. By 2009
the programme had allowed almost 9000 Japanese to
visit the Southern Kuril Islands, and around 7000
Russian residents of the islands to travel to Japan
without a visa (Borisov 2009). Kuril islanders greatly
appreciated the opportunity to meet with their neigh-
bours, who they were isolated from in Soviet times, as
well the chance it provided to buy much needed
consumer goods in Japan. However, these visits also
had the side-effect of exposing significant disparities in
living standards and, in 1998, the then Governor of
Sakhalin, Igor Farkhutdinov, admitted that
some of the first residents of the Kurils to visit Japan on the
visa-free programme were shocked at the difference in social
and economic development of the territories, which are only
separated by a small channel. There was a lack of compre-
hension at why over there it is so good but here it is not so
good. (1998, np)
These uncomfortable differences, and the unusual
sovereignty regime implied by the programme, also
resulted in some members of the political elite coming
out strongly against it. Sergei Ponomarev, the then
leader of a group of deputies in the Sakhalin regional
Duma lobbying for the Southern Kurils to remain
Russian, railed against what he regarded as the
inherently political aspects of Japanese visa-free visits
to the islands, which he believes are
Directed at fixing the dependency of the citizens of the
Kurils on Japan, continuing economic stagnation on the
islands and neutralising the patriotic feelings of the popu-
lation, thus creating an atmosphere of uncertainly for the
future and, ultimately, the seizure of the islands from Russia
and the destruction of its territorial integrity . . . (2005, np)
Such fears were inflamed in July 2009 when Japan’s
parliament passed amendments to a bill on the
‘Northern Territories’ that named the four Southern
Kurils ‘the historical territory of Japan’ (Borisov 2009,
np). A resolution was swiftly approved in the Federal
Council of the Russian Federation (Russia’s upper
house), denouncing the Japanese declaration, and
appealing to the then Russian President, Dmitri
Medvedev, to consider introducing a moratorium on
the visa-free programme (Anon 2009).
While at first criticising the announcement by Japan,
Igor Koval’, Chair of the South Kuril district legislative
assembly, stressed that Kuril Islanders also enjoy these
travels, emphasising the strong contacts in culture,
sports and the conservation of nature that have been
established with the Japanese over the duration of the
programme (Borisov 2009). He also noted that for
people living on the Southern Kurils, this kind of travel
offered an opportunity to leave the islands for a
holiday, as many people simply could not afford to
spend their holidays in Russian cities because the
tickets were so expensive (Borisov 2009). On any
decisions by the federal authorities towards suspending
visa-free travel, Koval’ stated that
We only implement these decisions, but we would like the
government to pay heed to the opinion of the local population
and not to take extreme and radical decisions that could
affect, first of all, ordinary people. (Borisov 2009, np)
In sharp contrast to certain politicians in the regional
and national parliaments, Koval’ demonstrated that
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maintaining the visa-free programme – and remaining
in certain ways outside a ‘normal’ sovereignty regime –
was a benefit that Southern Kuril islanders cherished.
For them, the improvements and opportunities it
offered took precedence over replicating the patriotic
exhortations on territorial integrity exhibited elsewhere
in Russia (Richardson 2010).
Humanitarian aid
The visa-free programme also served as a means for the
delivery of Japanese humanitarian aid to the islanders.
This became literally a matter of life or death when,
just after midnight on 4 October 1994, a huge earth-
quake and tsunami hit the islands, killing 11 civilians
and injuring 242 (Pararas-Carayannis 2000). In its
immediate aftermath, Japan acted fastest, providing
emergency help and arranging for the most seriously
injured to be airlifted out to receive free hospital
treatment on Hokkaido (Elizar’ev 1999, 166). The
earthquake and tidal wave flattened buildings and
according to local accounts destroyed practically all
infrastructure (Koval’ 2001, 16). On Shikotan more
than 60 per cent of residential buildings were
destroyed, while 40 per cent of the buildings of the
fishing cooperative Ostrovnoi collapsed; all diesel
generators on Kunashir and Shikotan ceased function-
ing; and water, sewage and heating systems were ruined
(Hasegawa 1998, 491).
While the Russian state proved incapable of provid-
ing resources for rebuilding, between 1993 and 2002,
Japan, through its humanitarian programme to the
Southern Kurils, rendered
fuel oil, food stuffs, medical supplies, and built three small
diesel generators, warehouses, clinics and piers. In all, Tokyo
spent on these aims around Y8.8B ($66.5 million).
(Mingazhev 2002, 18)
The Japanese builders and engineers contracted to
work on these projects were able to travel without visas
and they provided a visible sign of Japanese assistance
when it was all but absent from the Russian state
(Williams 2003b, 113). Even seven years after the
earthquake, Koval’ calculated in 2001 that for the
preceding three years Russian federal investment to the
Southern Kurils stood at around $2.5 million, while
Japanese humanitarian help for 1998 and 1999 alone
was around $10 million (Koval’ 2001, 16). He noted
that, ‘practically all new structures on Shikotan were
built by the humanitarian [help] of our neighbour’
(2001, 16).
In 1999, an article in Kommersant Vlast claimed that
‘most inhabitants of the southern Kurils, because of
food shortages and neglect, dream only about unifica-
tion with the riches of Japan’ (Ivanov 1999, np). While
in 2001, Dal’nevostochnyi Kapital noted that there are a
number of islanders,
who exhausted by the disorder of their own lives and
dependence on the humanitarian help of the Japanese, are
prepared for any decision, if only their lives would acquire a
human appearance. (Karedin 2001, 17)
Partly as a result of concerns over the influence of this
aid on the islanders ‘patriotic spirit’, voiced by
politicians on Sakhalin (Ponomarev 2005), and along-
side Russia’s dramatically improved state finances, in
2009 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
requested that Japan stop the provision of humanitar-
ian aid.
From the start of the new financial year, 1 April
2010, the Japanese side agreed to end its programme.
At the local level, this announcement brought with it
certain criticism among islanders towards Moscow.
Valentin Smorchkov, head of the The Kuril-Japanese
Centre (the organisation on the Kurils that manages
visa-free delegations), declared to Kommersant that, it
is ‘with a pain in my heart that I receive the news about
the ceasing of humanitarian assistance’ (Il’yushchenko
2009, np). According to Smorchkov, over the last 17
years Japan had rendered to the inhabitants of the
islands $23 million of help through the delivery of
medical supplies and equipment, and free operations in
Japanese hospitals. Smorchkov was convinced that
‘thanks to the humanitarian aid and the visa-free
exchange the lives of 98 children had been saved’
(Il’yushchenko 2009, np). These sentiments were
echoed by Anatolii Svetlov, head of the Kuril town-
district, who explained that ‘the local authorities take
no pleasure in the refusal of aid [but] if the MFA have
notified the government of Japan, we must accept it’
(Il’yushchenko 2009, np).
For Kuril islanders, humanitarian aid and the visa-
free programme had become a significant component
in a unique set of forces on the hyper-border. It had
helped generate among the islanders new ways of
thinking about the Russian state, tested their loyalties
to it and further demonstrated the socio-economic
opportunities offered by their immediate neighbour.
Throughout the 1990s, the Russian state’s sovereignty
over these islands was rendered increasingly ambiguous
as Japan began to provide infrastructure, healthcare
and education facilities, as well as other amenities and
services that would normally have been the exclusive
domain of the Russian state. It was Japanese aid that
guaranteed welfare and reconstruction, and many
islanders greatly appreciated such assistance at a time
when they needed it most. With the Russian state
conspicuous by its absence, for some of the islanders
their loyalties began to fracture. For those enduring the
hardships of life on the Southern Kurils, the ‘messy,
contested, and often intensely social business of making
territory “integral”’ had become even messier (Reeves
2014, 6).
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Divided loyalties on the hyper-border
Against this background, from the early 1990s, public
opinion among islanders on the destiny of the Southern
Kurils began to waver. On 25 April 1993, a local
referendum on the 1956 Joint Declaration (which
stipulated the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan in
return for a Peace Treaty) was held in Malokuril’sk –
the main town on Shikotan. Just over half of the town’s
residents (913 individuals) participated, with 83 per
cent reportedly supporting the recognition of this
agreement (Vysokov et al. 1995, 352, cited in Kuroiwa
2011, 292; Hokkaido Shimbun 26 and 28 April 1993,
cited in Williams 2007, 140). An appeal was subse-
quently dispatched by the residents of Malokuril’sk to
both the Japanese and the Russian governments, urging
them to resolve the issue of ownership as soon as
possible. In a further indication of the desperate
situation on Shikotan in summer 1994, more than half
of the islands’ residents signed another petition to the
then Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, and the Japanese
Prime Minister, Tomiichi Murayama, this time pleading
for aid in order to help them leave the islands
(Hokkaido Shimbun 17 August 1994, cited in Hasegawa
1998, 612).
By 1997 the head of the administration of the
Southern Kurils, Vladimir Zema, announced to ITAR-
TASS that the economic and social situation on all of
the islands had reached such acuteness that ‘if we now
organised a referendum about their destiny then the
result would be unambiguous – to separate them from
Russia’ (Golovnin and Solntsev 1997, 9). At around the
same time, Zema was reported to have sent an appeal
to Tokyo pleading for financial help, which he said
should go directly to the islands, and not via Moscow
(Izvestiya 4 October 1997, 1–2, cited in Kuhrt 2007, 96).
In 1998, the then Governor of Sakhalin, Igor Farkhut-
dinov, admitted that ‘some of the Kuril Islanders may
in secret hope that they will live under the Japanese’
(1998, np). However, throughout the 1990s, these
hopes did not seem so secret and in the same year a
survey of 1000 residents on Kunashir, Iturup and
Shikotan revealed that 44 per cent agreed with uncon-
ditional or limited conditions to be attached to the
transfer of these islands, with 42 per cent against
(NHK-japantoday.ru cited in Kataeva 2006).5
It is necessary to note that islanders’ opinions on the
islands’ sovereignty have often been skewed towards
obtaining concessions from local politicians (Kuhrt
2011, 259). However, whether they were motivated by a
genuine appeal to join the Japanese state, or a desire to
capture maximal resources from the federal centre,
these polls nevertheless came to present a dramatic
challenge to the authority of the Russian state. Another
poll of the local residents on Iturup and Shikotan
conducted in 1998 also demonstrated an intriguing
division between opinions on two of the islands: 65 per
cent of Shikotan residents reportedly agreed with the
transfer to Japan of the islands. However, on Iturup, 87
per cent of the residents came out against it (japanto-
day.ru cited in Kataeva 2006). In 2001, Koval’ explained
that ‘amongst the Kuril population, especially residents
of Shikotan, [there is] a pro-Japanese feeling arising
from their poor standard of living’ (2001, 16).
One of the most recent polls was carried out in 2005
and commissioned by Hokkaido Shimbun in coopera-
tion with the Sakhalin newspaper, Svoboda Sakhalin,
which included questionnaires distributed and collected
by local Russian researchers (Iwashita 2006, 43). It
found that across all three of the populated Southern
Kuril Islands (Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup), 28.7 per
cent favoured the conditional transfer of the islands,
with 61.3 per cent opposed to any transfer. However,
significant differences again emerged between the
islands: 80 per cent of Iturup residents were against
any transfer of the islands, with 63 per cent on Kunashir
and 41 per cent on Shikotan (here half of all respon-
dents favoured a conditional transfer of the islands)
(2006, 48). For those in favour of a conditional transfer
of the islands to Japan, 83.7 per cent of respondents
indicated that this condition should be monetary
compensation (Iwashita 2006, 49).
Reasons for a difference between the islands could,
in part, be due to the fact that on Shikotan residents
have been prepared for a transfer of the islands since
the stipulations of the 1956 Declaration.6 In 1957,
around 2000 Soviet citizens who had moved to
Shikotan and the Habomai were ordered to leave in
anticipation of their handover. Citizens returned to
Shikotan in 1960, but the Habomai remained uninhab-
ited (Bondarenko 1992, 116; Wada 1999, 267, cited in
Kuroiwa 2011, 288). Others have noted that the
proximity of Shikotan to Japan has created practically
‘no problem in the shadowy transfer of fishing catches’
so that ‘the serious integration into the Japanese
economy and pro-Japanese feeling on Shikotan is more
noticeable than on Iturup’ (Nikitin 2005, 16). This same
article also pointed out that, of those who had left for
the mainland in the 1990s, Shikotan received a dispro-
portionately greater number of islanders returning to
their former homes a few years later, and among this
particular group of migrants there ‘exist those who
make no secret that they are waiting for their $100 000
compensation promised by the Japanese [in the case of
the island’s transfer]’ (2005, 16).
It has also been suggested that dual-citizenship could
be offered to islanders by Japan – together with high-
waged employment, a sufficient pension and free
medical services for senior citizens – if any transfer of
the islands ever took place (Kataeva 2006). However,
dual-nationality would likely be temporary as Japanese
law does not recognise such status and stipulates that
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citizens should choose their nationality before they
reach 22 (Japanese Ministry of Justice nd), making it
likely that future generations would be forced to
renounce their Russian citizenship. Even so, such
incentives appear to have had a dramatic effect on
local opinion and the surveys of the islanders became
pregnant with significance, while their conduct was
fiercely opposed in some quarters. Perhaps related to
this anxiety, there has recently been a lack of surveys on
the islands. In 2006 the Southern Kurils were desig-
nated a special border zone, which demanded permis-
sions from the authorities to visit and made the conduct
of research and surveys on the islands increasingly
difficult. The absence of such polls also corresponds
with the words of former Sakhalin Governor (1990–93),
Valentin Fedorov, who exclaimed that
A survey takes place when something is unclear. In relation
to the Southern Kurils nothing is unclear. Therefore we
don’t need to weaken our own position, don’t need to create
for our partner the impression that we experience confusion
or fluctuation. (2004, 324)
For Fedorov, the fact that these surveys are even carried
out presents a dangerous challenge to state sovereignty
– a challenge with the potential to undermine the great
rhetorical efforts employed by him and others to ensure
that the Southern Kurils remain an integral part of
Russia. These efforts involve a broad coalition of
political and intellectual elites in both Moscow and on
Sakhalin for whom the islands remaining Russian is a
national imperative (see, for example, Arin 2001;
Fedorov 2004; Gryzlov 2005; Kolomeitsev 2003;
Latyshev 2003; Margelov 2006; Narochnitskaya 2000;
Ponomarev 2002; Timanov 2004). As Fedorov put it in
regard to the Southern Kurils, ‘everything is immaterial
in relation to that first rate, irreplaceable treasure –
territory’ (2004, 326). His sentiments reflect the fact
that from the very first days of the new Russian
Federation, the Kuril issue was seized upon by a
committed group of nationalists. Factions of the polit-
ical elite proved to be highly adept at ‘nationalising’ the
Kuril issue, and invoking through it their own variant of
a patriotic rhetoric that privileged the territorial
integrity of the state. The issue had such resonance
that was a key factor in the cancellation of Yeltsin’s
official visit to Japan in 1992, as well as a concession
from the government to hold hearings in the State
Duma on the islands’ future, which took place in July of
the same year (see Buszynski 1993).
Similar hearings again took place in the State Duma
in 2002 after intensive lobbying by politicians on
Sakhalin. Both hearings were dominated by pronounce-
ments and exhortations on the necessity of the islands
remaining part of Russia, and in this we see how
debates surrounding the islands can be instantaneously
communicated and amplified, exploited and exclaimed
upon in distant national and regional capitals. The
fractures in state-space revealed on the hyper-border
run to sites far removed from the islands, where they
can be taken up in order to reconstitute and reify a
fiction of territorial integrity and inviolable national
space. Yet, such a calculating use of the islanders’
situation did not go unnoticed on the islands them-
selves, and as one journalist recounted, ‘the naked
demands of some deputies of the [Sakhalin] regional
Duma towards demonstrating a Greater-Russian con-
sciousness only irritate Kuril Islanders’ (Nikitin 2005,
21).7
This discussion of the wavering of loyalty towards
the Russian state – seen at the level of official discourse
at the local and national level, as well as in opinion
polls – does not constitute a denial that the lives and
identities of islanders remained uninfluenced by eth-
nicity, religion and language. These endured as impor-
tant factors. However, the sentiments outlined here
also demonstrate how a number of impoverished
islanders began to contribute ideas that were contra-
dictory and even heretical to prevailing national
identity visions. They helped to define and shape the
political imagination of the community living on these
islands, as well as provoking a counter-function else-
where in Russia. Ultimately, their ambiguous endorse-
ment of Russian sovereignty helped to stimulate – from
the mid-2000s onwards – the transformation of these
islands into a different kind of symbol: one of a
resurgent state and strong leadership, finally able to
exercise political authority across the entirety of
national space.
Return of the centre
This final section explores how the fracturing and
rupturing of loyalty to the state on the hyper-border
also served to reaffirm discourses surrounding Russian
national identity and territorial integrity, which culmi-
nated in a significant re-engagement of the Russian
state with these islands and their residents. In parallel
with the state’s dramatically improved fiscal stability,
the Russian leadership during the 2000s sought to
reinstate on this site a sovereign presence more familiar
to Soviet times. The meaning of the hyper-border was
reformatted as these islands were recast as a stage on
which to project a message about the ambitions of
national development goals, resurgent state-power and
the effective political authority of the Russian state.
In August 2006 the scale of earlier federal develop-
ment programmes was eclipsed when a Programme of
Social and Economic Development of the Kuril Islands
for 2007–2015 was announced (Anon 2006). The then
Minister of Economic Development and Trade, Ger-
man Gref, declared that the ambitious goal of the new
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programme was to increase both the island’s popula-
tion and industrial output by 50 per cent, with the
government promising 17.9 billion roubles ($668 mil-
lion) across all of the Kuril Islands in order to achieve
this (Interfax, RIA-Novosti, 3 August 2006, cited in
Blagov 2006). He emphasised that infrastructure
improvements would be a priority, including new
electricity-generating facilities and an all-weather air-
port, as there was still ‘no stable air service there, and
people are unable to get away from the islands for
weeks’ (Blagov 2006, np). Reporting on the massive
development plan, the magazine Itogi offered a positive
analysis, suggesting that
On one of the most backward and furthest of Russian
regions appeared a ray of hope. If the government holds to
its word [the islands] will be transformed into the most
budgetary-subsidised part of Russia. For each resident of the
Kurils it is proposed that there will be spent $1000 a month –
that is 40 per cent more than Japan spends on each of its
own nationals. (Chudodeev 2006, np)
The website of Russia’s dominant political party,
Edinaya Rossiya, declared with great fanfare that at
long last the Kurils will ‘cease to be the islands of bad
luck and a self-sufficient future will emerge there. It
will be possible following this to fearlessly confirm
“They are far from Moscow but [they are] ours!”’
(Bobkov 2006, np). To highlight the state’s newfound
ability to develop these territories, just a year after the
programme was announced, Russian Foreign Minister,
Sergei Lavrov, visited Sakhalin and the Kurils in
summer 2007. On his visit he was effusive about the
programme’s progress and achievements, and empha-
sised that further improvements would continue to be
implemented (Lavrov 2007).
This new symbolism of the Kurils was not lost on the
political elite, who started coming to the islands in
increasing numbers. In the same year as Lavrov’s visit, a
group comprised of members of the regional Duma and
deputies from the Federal Council toured the islands to
observe the reconstruction (Pustovalova 2007). Boris
Borisov, a deputy of the Sakhalin regional Duma, was a
member of this expedition and he was keen to praise
the results of the programme and the change in the
islanders’ attitude, stating that
Two years ago the mood of the people was different [ . . . ]
Many residents sharply and openly spoke about the fact that
if the federal centre does not wish to pay attention to the
situation on the Kurils then let their neighbours be engaged
with development and they will create favourable conditions
for life. Today, as we have seen, this situation has radically
changed. (Pustovalova 2007, np)
The next senior statesman to visit the islands was the
then Chairman of the Federal Council, Sergei Mironov
(also a Candidate for President in 2004 and 2012),
whose trip in summer 2009 included a photo-call of him
standing on the shoreline, clutching a Russian flag, and
calling for the development of ‘patriotic’ tourism as
‘every citizen of our country will be interested to visit
these places’ (Chkanikov 2009, np). However, by far
the most significant indicator of the centre’s renewed
interest in these islands came in November 2010, when
then President, Dmitri Medvedev, became the first
serving Russian or Soviet leader to visit the disputed
islands (Samigullina 2010). During his tour he visited a
geothermal power station, kindergarten, newly built
piers and homes – all constructed as part of the Federal
Programme. He emphasised that ‘here there will be a
better life, such as that in the centre of Russia [ . . . ]
and if there are normal conditions for life here, then
people will of course come’ (Sergeev 2010, np).
Three months after Medvedev’s visit, a reporter from
Japan’s Kyodo News visited Yuzhno-Kurilsk and noted
that ‘While locals once used to hope that their island’s
sovereignty would revert back to Japan, their views have
markedly changed’ (Anon 2011c, np). In contrast to
earlier polls, one Russian reporter from a local newspa-
per claimed that nowadays ‘more than 90 per cent of the
islanders are against it’ (2011c, np). In January 2012,
Foreign Minister Lavrov even stated that there could
now be a referendum of local residents in order to
determine the Southern Kuril’s future (Artemov 2012).
Such a suggestion would have been unthinkable in
earlier years, and the idea of referendum demonstrated
just how confident the leadership had become in the
influence of the federal development programme. With
a federal presence definitively restated, it represented a
dramatic shift in centre–periphery relations and a
renewed belief among the islanders that the Russian
state could finally help better their socio-economic
conditions and overcome the painful lack of attention
and neglect that they had experienced throughout much
of the post-Soviet period.
After his visit, Medvedev also quickly dispatched to
the Southern Kurils the then Deputy Prime Minister,
Igor Shuvalov; Deputy Defence Minister, Dmitry
Bulgakov; Head of Regional Development, Viktor
Basargin; and Defence Minister, Anatolii Serdyukov.
This stream of high-profile visits was accompanied in
early 2011 by Assistant to the President, Sergei
Prikhod’ko, announcing to journalists that ‘the sover-
eignty of the Russian Federation in regard to the Kuril
Islands neither today nor tomorrow will be subject to
any kind of revision’ (Anon 2011a). His message was
reinforced in February 2011 when Medvedev confirmed
the deployment of upgraded weaponry on the Kurils ‘in
order to ensure the security of the islands as an integral
part of Russia’ (Anon 2011b, np),8 and yet again when
he returned to Kunashir as Prime Minister in summer
2012.
With such dramatic actions and statements, the
symbolism of the Southern Kurils as a hyper-border
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became somewhat diminished as it was rendered a site
more firmly anchored to Russian state-space. The
adaptive strategies of the islanders, and the invocations
of their fluctuating loyalties in the press and in polls,
had helped generate an immense state-led effort
towards overcoming an apparent aberration in local
and national identities that had appeared on the hyper-
border. As the state reasserted its presence, the
allegiances of islanders to the Russian state were
seemingly reconstituted. Yet, it was the tensions
engendered by the Southern Kurils existing ‘beyond’
state-space that had initially stimulated such a signif-
icant material and discursive investment in reengaging,
reenergising and redeveloping this region. This coun-
ter-function of the hyper-border precipitated a recovery
of the meaning of the Kurils and remade them as a
symbol of the territorial integrity of a resurgent state,
which was finally able to ensure the welfare of even its
most isolated and distant citizens. The programme for
developing the islands, and the attendant reconfigura-
tion of the hyper-border, demonstrated that – unlike in
other regions of Russia – voices on such an extremity
can possess an ephemeral but remarkable quality to
echo all the way to the very centre of the state.
Conclusion
Drawing on a literature dealing with borders, periph-
eries and remote places, this paper has charted the
features and implications of a locale that has moved in
certain ways beyond state-space. In the 1990s, the
Southern Kurils were a site where the Russian state was
no longer able to provide essential structures and
services to its citizens. While such a situation was not
unique to other places in post-Soviet Russia, these
islands were also subject to a territorial dispute and
were where an inter-state border between Japan and
Russia essentially dematerialised. Throughout the
1990s, legal and illegal economic contacts with Japan
intensified at the same time as a visa-free programme
and humanitarian aid saw Kuril islanders become more
dependent on the Japanese state than on the Russian
one. From healthcare to heating, Japan was providing
infrastructure and services that had previously been the
exclusive domain of the Russian/Soviet state. Under
such conditions, loyalties on the hyper-border became
fractured in the form of a profound challenge to the
political authority and territorial integrity of the
Russian state. Unlike elsewhere in Russia, this sepa-
ratist challenge was not articulated by the residents of
this territory on ethnic, religious or linguistic grounds,
but on a purely instrumental desire for a better life.
Framed through an understanding of how gaps and
ruptures on the border work to both unravel and
reconstitute the state, this paper has traced dissonances
between the rhetoric of state elites and the local reality of
the Russian state’s political authority. We have seen how
these ‘gaps’ were exploited by those who found them-
selves on a site neither fully within nor without the state.
It is this ambivalence – between and betwixt states – that
constitutes the essence of the hyper-border. It is what
rendered these islands a polemical site, where the
material and psychological impact of everyday hardships
led to an extraordinary and heretical desire among some
islanders for a future beyond Russia. This idea of the
hyper-border serves to expose the contingent, malleable
and pragmatic nature of identity under the quotidian
realities of fluctuating state-authority. It provides an
insight into a local political imagination, which was
energised and organised around becoming more fully
incorporated into the structures and services of the state,
regardless of whether they were deployed by Russia or
Japan (cf. Scott 2009). In such circumstances, islanders
became manipulators of identity politics in ways that
ultimately worked to subvert, negotiate and remake
taken-for-granted notions surrounding ideas of state,
nation and sovereignty.
It is a set of conditions not confined to the distant
periphery of the Southern Kurils. From Crimea to
the Cerdanya, the Falkland/Malvinas Islands to the
Fergana Valley, and among the scattered enclaves of
the Indian–Bangladeshi borderlands, we see these
processes reproduced and replicated. These sites also
demonstrate the ephemeral nature of the hyper-border,
where it possesses a counter-function that can stimulate
a sudden reaction and the rapid reincorporation of
these locales into the orbit of the state. On the Kurils,
as elsewhere, the hyper-border exists simultaneously at
the state’s extremity and at its core. It is a term that
serves to vividly illustrate the various forms of power –
economic, political and cultural – that are inherent in
both constituting sovereignty and in ‘persuading’ peo-
ple of their identity.
An insecurity and vulnerability of existing ‘beyond’
state-space propelled the voices of Kuril islanders to
the centre of a far broader ‘national’ debate. Whether
or not the islanders’ were articulating a genuine plea
towards becoming part of Japan, or merely a way to
capture the resources of the federal centre, it is from an
aberration in nationalist discourses – and the Russian
state’s response to it – that the debates swirling over
these last barren islands have helped make, and
unmake, Russia. Through the lens of the hyper-border
we can glimpse communities on the extreme periphery
of the nation striving to be more fully subsumed by the
processes and provisions of the state. It is here that the
presences and absences of the state can most dramat-
ically shape communities, yet it is also where these
communities are empowered, emboldened and adap-
tive enough to articulate an alternative vision of
identity that can take them beyond the nation and into
the state.
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Notes
1 The ‘Southern Kurils’ correspond with Japan’s claim on
the ‘Northern Territories’, which represent the islands of
Kunashir, Shikotan, Iturup and the Habomai Group. As
the sources of this research are primarily in Russian, the
Russian terms for these islands are used throughout,
though this is not intended to privilege the Russian claim.
2 Although developed by Scott, Zomia was first outlined by
Willem von Schendel, and derived from Zo (remote) and
Mi (people) (see Scott 2009, 15–16).
3 The term was first used by Fernando Romero and his
emphasis on the ‘unprecedenteddegree of interdependence’
between Mexico and the USA (Romero/LAR 2008, 15).
4 Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai constitute today’s
Southern Kuril District, while Iturup is classified as within
the separate Kuril District, which includes Urup. However,
all the disputed islands (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and
the Habomai) are commonly and collectively referred to as
the Southern Kurils, and this is how the term is used in this
paper, unless specifically stated otherwise. The Soviet
administrative region of Sakhalin Oblast’ was created in
1947 (Anon 1947), and consists of Sakhalin Island and all
the islands of the Kuril chain.
5 While public opinion polls come with inherent dangers of
bias, leading questions and small sample sizes, it is
suggested here that the number of polls carried out, and
their triangulation with newspaper editorials, reports,
academic texts and the statements of prominent local
officials, point towards sentiments that were deep-seated
and widely held.
6 This proposal was returned to in a public statement by
Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, in November
2004.
7 It is also noteworthy that on Sakhalin public opinion has
remained consistently and categorically against any hint of
territorial concession. For certain political elites in
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the disputed islands became a way to
bolster their support and further political careers (see
Anno 2006; Williams 2007).
8 It is a process that continues to the present day (see Putz
2015).
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